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Abstract
Biondi et al. (2012) develop an analytical model to examine the emergent dynamic
properties of share market price formation over time, capable to capture important
stylized facts. These latter properties prove to be sensitive to regulatory regimes for
fundamental information provision, as well as to market confidence conditions among
actual and potential investors. Regimes based upon mark-to-market (fair value) mea-
surement of traded security, while generating higher linear correlation between market
prices and fundamental signals, also involve higher market instability and volatility.
These regimes also incur more relevant episodes of market exuberance and vagary in
some regions of the market confidence space, where lower market liquidity further
occurs.
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1 Introduction and Related Literature
Share Exchanges (financial markets) are socio-economic devices that enable interactions and
exchanges between potential buyers and potential sellers while dynamically fixing market
prices of exchanged securities. Financial economists have developed elegant models that
explain the eventual equilibrium results of this process, without going into the details of
price-setting mechanisms. This literature generally identifies two drivers guiding the market
price-setting process: matching of supply and demand, and information, with the latter be-
ing emphasized by recent contributions on efficient financial markets (Bouchaud et al. 2009;
Shiller 2013; Fama 2013; Stiglitz and Gallegati 2011; Markowitz 2005). Informationally ef-
ficient markets fully and correctly integrate any new (i.e. unexpected) information that
affects the fundamental value of traded securities into their price. Due to rational expec-
tations, market prices are expected to change only with unexpected news: informational
efficiency implies then that current price (pt) is the best predictor of future ones, making the
price time series a random walk. Formally:
pt+1 = E(pt|Ft)
Ft = ǫt with ǫt i.i.d. → pt ∼ N(p¯, σǫ).
Accordingly, fundamental value is supposed to exist and to be correctly known by at least
some informed investors who can then act as arbitrageurs between ongoing market prices
and that reference value, making a temporary (or illusory) profit while driving back the
market price towards its fundamental benchmark, through the very impact of their trades.
Indeed the arbitrage mechanism stands at the core of the equilibrium approach to efficient
financial markets and can be used to justify the unpredictability of market prices in the long
run (Malkiel 2003; LeBaron 2006; Iori and Porter 2012; LeRoy 2004). Alternatively, each
agent can observe the fundamental value with some noise, which may then be progressively
eliminated through emergent information extracted, over time, from evolving market prices
and interactions. Following Hayek (1945), markets can also be studied as aggregators of
dispersed information. No investor can then observe fundamental value, but the market
aggregating process enables its emergent collective discovery.
As equilibrium approaches do not disentangle the specifics of the trading process, the in-
teractional nature of its dynamics and its epistemic preconditions, concerns have been raised
that this modelization strategy does not correctly lead our understanding of share markets
activity especially in the context choosing regulatory designs and regimes (Shubik 2007;
Kirman 1999; Biondi 2011b). In particular, Sunder (1997) chapter 7, noted that information
from outside the market pricing process needs to be gathered and interpreted by market
players in order to be integrated in the market prices; quoting the author: ‘the hypothesis of
instantaneous adjustment of price to new information leads paradoxically to the conclusion
that such an adjustment cannot occur due to the absence of private incentives to gather
information’. Being subject to investigation and interpretation by market players, funda-
mental value becomes quite an abstract concept which cannot be computed with arbitrary
accuracy at every instant in time, with whatever amount of required information available.
At the very least, some irreducible margin of judgment and intrinsic error shall remain. As
Pareto (1906) page 30 argued:
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In a volume on economics recently published we find that “the price is a concrete
manifestation of value.” We are already familiar with the incarnations of Buddha. To them
we are now asked to add the incarnations of Value.
In contrast, a reasonable (realistic) modelization strategy is to accept that investors
idiosyncratically interpret evolving signals of fundamental performance that deliver noisy in-
formation about the share-issuing corporate group. As each investor interprets information
idiosyncratically, no universal consensus is expected. Investors interact one with another to
form their focal price opinions. Trade is then based on disagreement (Stout 2011; Biondi
2011a) and investors are confronted to the collective dynamic dimension of aggregating sup-
ply and demand through the Share Exchange. This dimension introduces an opportunity to
profit from the ongoing evolution of aggregate market prices over time. Arbitrage strategies
can then be based upon the dynamics of fundamental signals or market prices. A dy-
namic tension may especially exist between speculative (or chartist) strategies based upon
aggregate market prices, and fundamentalist strategies based upon fundamental signals of
reference. Furthermore, the process that generates information about the fundamental per-
formance of the share-issuing entity is not a phenomenon neutral to the market dynamics.
Fundamental signals are generated through institutional devices external to the market that
facilitate its working (Phelps 1987; Frydman 1982; Fama and French 1992). These insti-
tutions provide common knowledge that nurtures fundamental financial analysis processes.
Let us define the whole of financial reporting and disclosure, financial analysis techniques
and related standards as a common knowledge regime. These regimes assume specific forms,
including distinctive accounting regimes that define financial performance and position of
the share-issuing corporate group over time. Last but not least, investors factually do not
take their decisions in isolation but are subject to social influence and interaction. The
study of the impact of this social dimension on agents’ behaviour has been developed by a
recent strand of economic literature (see Aldashev et al. 2011; Ozsoylev and Walden 2011;
Kukacka and Barunik 2013). While this paper does not analyze the dynamic effect of social
dimension, it deals with an overall market confidence space that comprises the combination
of all the possible states of confidence among and across both sides of the market.
This paper elaborates on the analysis and results by Biondi et al. (2012) which, draw-
ing upon this modelisation strategy, develop an analytical model where investors’ decision-
making is influenced by four dynamic drivers:
(i) Heterogeneity at individual and group levels, leading to trade on disagreement;
(ii) A fundamental information signal generating common knowledge over time;
(iii) An emergent social interaction dynamics shaping individual and group beliefs, expec-
tations and forecasts;
(iv) A market pricing mechanism that aggregates the decisions of investors (orders to sell,
to buy or just wait) which disagree according to possibly diverse opinions and profit
opportunities.
The present paper assesses the systemic properties of the financial system in terms of
market volatility, exuberance, vagary, liquidity and stability, through the analysis of the
3
impact of these drivers on the formation of market prices over time and contexts. These
systemic properties prove to be sensitive to common knowledge regimes (which correspond
to stylized accounting models of reference for financial reporting and disclosure, namely
historical cost and fair value accounting models). Through numerical simulation, we develop
a comprehensive economic analysis of the influence of different common knowledge regimes
coupled with various combinations of speculative and fundamentalist beliefs across supply
and demand sides. Simulations generate distinctive market price series for every regulatory
regime across financial system conditions, enabling comparative analysis of financial systemic
performances across time and contexts.
From a policy perspective, our numerical analysis contributes to the efforts to imagine and
design regulatory regimes which show higher degrees of systemic stability and sustainability
under a large set of circumstances.
Furthermore, our numerical results provide relevant theoretical points that may further
improve conceptual design of control systems such as accounting and prudential regulation.
In particular, our disagreement-based analytical model captures and explains Shiller (2000)’s
market exuberance that is endogenously generated by the market pricing process over space
and time. It also provides a theoretical explanation of fair value accounting pro-cyclical
contribution to market bubbling (Enria et al. 2004; Boyer 2007). Furthermore, these results
may be empirically tested against actual share market dynamics, while helping to improve
on existing empirical tests for market volatility, exuberance, vagary, liquidity and stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the building blocks of
the model and related notation. This is followed by a discussion (Section 3) of the calibration
used to test the model. The remaining sections provide numerical results regarding the
impact of the drivers discussed above on share price formation, pointing to market pricing
(Section 4.1), volatility (Section 4.2), exuberance (Section 4.3), and liquidity (Section 4.4).
Furthermore, information quality is assessed in term of linear correlation with and linear
forecasting power of market prices over time (Section (4.5)).
2 Model and Notation
Biondi et al. (2012) develop a heterogeneous agents model that generalizes received equilib-
rium approaches to financial market pricing process. This paper presents results based on
an extensive study of a simplified version of that model. This section summarizes it in its
main features and in its basic assumptions.
According to Aoki and Yoshikawa (2011) chapter 9, two broad categories of chartism and
fundamentalism account for most of possible investment strategies. Following Hirota and Sunder
(2007) and Heemeijer et al. (2009), we consider a large population of heterogeneous investors
which form their focal price expectations (upon which they base their trading strategies) ac-
cording to the following generic function:
Ei,j,t(pt+1) = pt +mj,t(pt − pt−1)− βi,j,tδi,j,t + γi,j,tφi(Ft) ∀i ∈ [0, 1], ∀j ⊂ (D;S), ∀t (1)
where
δi,j,t ≡ Ei,j,t(pt)− pt (2)
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Each generic investor i can belong to one of two groups j ⊂ (D;S). Group D is formed
by those investors that do not hold shares, implying potential demand, while group S is
formed by investors which hold shares (shareholders), implying potential supply. Equation
1 comprises four elements. The first is the past market clearing price pt. The second
is the signal generated by the market about the aggregate price trend (pt − pt−1). The
importance given to this market signal is weighted by the market confidence mj,t. The third
element is the individual forecast revision βi,j,tδi,j,t . It consists of the difference between
investor’s past price expectation and the last clearing market price that was actually realized
(Equation 2), weighted by βi,j,t which captures both group and individual heterogeneities.
The forth element denotes the formation of an individual opinion based upon available signal
of fundamental performance Ft, which is common knowledge for both market sides and all
the individual investors. This opinion is weighted then by the individual parameter φi, while
γi,j,t captures both group and individual heterogeneities.
According to this framework of analysis, the financial system is embedded in a dual
institutional structure which drives market pricing process: the enterprise entity side is
subsumed by the signal of fundamental performance Ft, while the market side is captured
by the market price trend (pt−pt−1). In particular, the institutional signal that incorporates
the fundamental performance (named Yt) of the corporate group whose security is traded is
generated by an exogenous mechanism of the type: Ft ≡ ft(Yt)− ft−1(Yt−1) with
t∑
h=1
Ft > 0.
This signal is assimilated by each agent idiosyncratically: each investor is then individually
characterized by a certain degree of fundamentalism (chartism), captured by the weight φi
he attributes to the signal of fundamental performance Ft : 0 ≤ φi ≤ 1 ∀i.
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The institutional signal’s generating process is inspired by distinctive accounting models
of reference, namely Fair Value Accounting (mark-to-market); Historical Cost Accounting
and one theoretical benchmark derived from equilibrium approaches, involving target-based
signaling provision. The latter regime assumes the very existence and relatively accurate
knowledge of fundamental value of reference by informed investors who wish to exploit
related signaling. While we may refer to the first two regimes as actual regimes, denoting
stylized practical modes of accounting, the latter regime can be only thought in a vacuum.
Formally, the Historical Random Trend Accounting (HRT) regime implies an
evolving exogenous signal of fundamental performance that is orthogonal to market price
dynamics, composed by a stochastic component resulting from positive and negative flows
together with a stochastic trend component (Biondi 2011c; Anthony 2004), i.e.:2
Ft = N [−1;+1] + Ft−1 · U
[
−
1
2
b,
1
2
b
]
+ ǫt with ∀ b = 1; (3)
with N [−1;+1] representing a value extracted from a normal distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation 1, bounded between −1 and +1 and U
[
−1
2
b, 1
2
b
]
representing a value
1Nevertheless, the actual degree of fundamentalism (chartism) for the whole marketplace is endogenously
determined by financial system dynamics, and does not depend only on these exogenous subjective attitudes
or beliefs.
2As robustness check we also simulated our model with a pure historical cost approach without the trend:
outcomes are extremely similar and relegated to appendix.
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extracted from a uniform distribution between the two indicated values.
A the opposite side of the spectrum, the Fair Value Accounting (FVA) regime implies
a pure mark-to-market accounting system that replicates market information with one time
lag (Kothari 2001; Nissim and Penman 2008):
Ft = (pt−1–pt−2) + ǫt ∀t. (4)
Finally, Stochastic Target Reverting Accounting (TRA-S) regime implies a reverting
fundamental performance signal that targets a given core value that is bounded within a
stochastic band of width ∆ due to white noise error of estimation and other random effects:3
Ft = −(pt − Ft−1) + ∆ + ǫt ∀t (5)
with ∆ ∼ N(0, 1) further bounded between [−1; 1]. This assumption about ∆ implies that,
under this regime, investors know deterministically the range of fundamental values that the
traded security can reach.
For all accounting regimes, the same stochastic error is added to account for estimation
error, measurement error and other random effects:
ǫt = N [−a; +a] with a ≥ 0 (6)
The last building block of our model is the mechanism through which the market price is
formed at every trade time t. Investors’ bidding strategy is based on their focal price expec-
tations. Actual shareholders can sell or wait for the next period, while potential shareholders
can buy or wait for the next period. Accordingly, every shareholder (i.e. each agent i with
{j = S}) wishes to sell if the clearing market price is higher than his focal price expectations,
that is, pt+1 ≥ Ei,D,t(pt+1), while every potential buyer ({j = D}) wishes to buy if the clear-
ing market price is smaller than his focal price expectations, that is, pt+1 ≤ Ei,D,t(pt+1). In
particular, extreme investors, which express fully speculative (φ = 0) or fully fundamentalist
(φ = 1) strategies, form their respective focal price expectations as follows:
Ei=0,j=S(pt+1) = pt +mi=0,S(pt − pt−1) + βi=0,j=S,tδi=0,j=S,t
E1,S(pt+1) = pt +m1,S(pt − pt−1) + β1,S,tδ1,S,t + Ft
E0,D(pt+1) = pt +m0,D(pt − pt−1) + β0,D,tδ0,D,t
E1,D(pt+1) = pt +m1,D(pt − pt−1) + β1,D,tδ1,D,t + Ft
(7)
At every trading time t, the model assumes an aggregate matching process (in line with
Di Guilmi et al. 2012; Foley 1994; Anufriev and Panchenko 2009; Chiarella and Iori 2002;
Horst 2005). The share exchange protocol receives all orders and ranks them on the base of
the focal prices expresses by the extreme investors as defined in Equations 7. This ranking is
based upon the assumption of a uniform distribution of focal prices between the extremes of
each market side (formally, φi ∼ U [0, 1] ∀i). This simplifying assumption enables to create a
market matching process which generates a complex market dynamics of the market clearing
pricing that is analytically treatable (see Biondi et al. (2012) for further details). Therefore,
3As robustness check we also simulated our model on a signal that reverts toward a precise value: results
are very similar and relegated to appendix.
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aggregate demand and supply depend on four focal prices expressed by ideal-type investors
over time, defined as follows:
P
j
t = maxarg[Et(pt+1)
j
i=0;Et(pt+1)
j
i=1] ∀j ∈ (D;S)
P
j
t = minarg[Et(pt+1)
j
i=0;Et(pt+1)
j
i=1] ∀j ∈ (D;S)
(8)
Accordingly, given the imposed uniform distribution of investors over each market side, the
Share Exchange Mechanism by aggregating and matching demand and supply delivers the
market clearing price, defined as:
pt+1 =


pNC = pt + η if P S,t ≤ PD,t
PS,t(PD,t−PD,t)+PD,t(PS,t−PS,t)
(PS,t−PS,t)+(PD,t−PD,t)
if P S,t ≥ PD,t
(9)
with η = N [0,1]
100
being a small tick value that is activated whether demand and offer
cannot be matched. In this case a new price is generated that is slightly different from the
one of the previous step.4 Aggregate market price dynamics enriches the passage between
the individual and the collective level, making the latter irreducible to the former. Each price
pattern becomes then unique over time and space. Replication of several patterns through
simulation enables then to infer regularities on the working of this financial system under its
distinctive conditions.
Finally, regarding our model, one could object to the absence of exchanged quantities
(and of individual agents’ portfolios). However, individual portfolios are irrelevant here, since
we study investors that are not budget constrained and that do form their focal prices on
past and next period expectations and posting their orders deterministically by comparing
their focal prices with past called price.
3 Simulation calibration
The bulk of our analysis is based on numerical simulations that study the systemic properties
of financial market price formation under alternative common knowledge regimes and over the
market confidence space. The latter space comprises all the possible combinations of market
confidence by investors on both market sides. The analytical model requires calibration to
perform this simulation analysis. This calibration does not purport here to obtain realistic
assumptions for the parameters, but to improve comparability between various parameter
sets and distinctive common knowledge regimes over the overall market confidence space.
In particular, while the measures of market confidence mS,D do change dynamically as
result of a social interaction, the present paper neglects this interaction and does analyse
simulations in which parameters value do not change over time. This choice is in line with
our objective of exploring the systemic effects of different degrees of market confidence. For
the same reason we simplify the general model by imposing the value of βi,j,t = 0.5 ∀i, j, t
and the value for the variable weighting the individual opinion γi,j,t = 1. Both calibrations
4The presence of this random error turns out to be without material impact on simulation results as
discussed in the next section.
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purport to obtain a symmetric setup around the median investor identified as φi = 0.5. This
symmetry choice follows from the hypothesis of uniform distribution between extreme focal
prices (on both market sides) and from the fact that all stochastic elements are normally
distributed.5 The choice of γ further implies that we exclude, for the sake of this analysis,
the existence of a systematic, evolutive, bias in the interpretation of Ft.
With these simplifications to the model, we run numerical simulations varyingmS andmD
between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.01. The market price distribution shows a scale-free property.
Therefore, for every number of replications, its mean (median) value and variance remains
similar for the same market price series length (number of simulated market periods), while,
if the number of replications increases, this synthetic measure increases for the same market
price series length. Our results are obtained averaging outcomes from series of 500 market
prices replicated over 1000 simulation rounds, allowing satisfying comparative analysis be-
tween financial systems under distinctive common knowledge regimes. To be sure, if market
price distribution is scale-free (power law), these synthetic measures do not characterize the
underlying distribution, but, at the same level of series length and replications, they remain
comparable between ‘imagined worlds of accounting’ and finance (Sunder 2011). Given the
characteristics of our model, each simulation tells a quite unique ’story’. However, we want
to avoid simulation’s results depending only on purely transient factors. For this reason, in
order to make simulations comparable across types of common knowledge regimes, for each
combination of parameters and simulation round, a given random seed is fixed and kept
constant whenever the same combination is repeated for another type of common knowledge
regime.
In the context of market price formation, whether, at one time step t, demand and supply
do not match at all (making thus impossible to generated an updated market price), the
auctioneer updates the past market price according to this formula: Pt = Pt−1+0.01 ·U(0; 1).
This small error is introduced in order to avoid dead-ends of the market price dynamics.
While this device is rarely called under HRT and TRA-S, it activates more often under
FVA6 especially where the market mood of the two sides is very different. However, where
mS and mD are not extremely different (that is, the areas where our focus and main findings
come from), the auctioneer interventions are very limited.
In order to deal with the possibility that, due to the interaction between the market price
dynamics and the fundamental signal dynamics, the market price does fall at (or below)
zero, an avoidance mechanism is introduced. Whenever the cumulated fundamental signal
(pointing to the underlying fundamental performance) falls at or below zero, this mechanism
jump-starts the signal for that period according to the formula: Ft = Ft−1 + U [0, 1]. This
mechanism is never used except under the FVA, where it is called very rarely (it activates a
maximum of 0.02% on the total steps number, with an average activation of 0.00083%).
As noticed discussing the model, to every fundamental signal, we add an error ǫt =
N [−a; +a] with a ≥ 0. The results of the model are especially sensitive to the magnitude of
5From our assumption that φi is distributed uniformly among the investors between 0 and 1, it follows
that values of the market confidence mS,D > 0.5 imply that the investors tend to be speculative. At the
opposite, when mS,D < 0.5 investors tend to be fundamentalists.
6For the FVA this device is called from a minimum of 0.11% of the times up to a maximum of 23, 92% of the
steps. It is called in average 7.9% of the steps (median 6.76%).Detailed about this variable as complementary
online material.
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Figure 1: Impact of the stochastic error ǫt (from Equation 6) added to the fundamental
signal (Ft) on mean (left panel) and median (right panel) price for HRT, FVA and TRA-S
common knowledge regimes.
this error under fair value accounting (FVA), since it is - by assumption - the only exogenous
shock that is stochastically added to the financial system under this regime. Figures 3 shows
that this error magnifies financial instability already at its first order (mean and median
market prices) under this regime. For sake of unbiased comparability of simulation results,
we calibrate this error at a = 0.1, in order to reduce its relative impact for all common
knowledge regimes. Finally, in order to ensure that the results reported below are accurate,
we are interested in knowing whether our simulations produce homoskedastic time series. For
each simulation, we run the Brown and Forsythe (1974)’s test for homogeneity of variances
(which we chose for his robustness to non-normal data distributions). This test is passed
about 95%of the times (at a significance level of 5%), providing satisfying confidence that
our results are robust and that can be tested with regression analyses.
4 Simulation Results
4.1 Market Pricing
By construction, all common knowledge regimes of fundamental signal provision are de-
signed to swing around the same mean (the initial price is fixed for all simulations to 1000).
Since, all stochastic elements are symmetric around this central point and do not impose any
systematic bias to the aggregate market pricing and to investor’s beliefs related to the fun-
damental signal, the mean (median) market price series is then expected to conform to this
benchmarking level. Every significative deviation from this central point can only depend on
the interaction between the investors’ expectations, the market matching protocol and the
evolution of the fundamental signal over time (under each distinctive common knowledge
regime). According to Table 1, both HRT and TRA-S produce results that remain around
this central point. The FVA signal shows a different result. Observing its distribution of
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mean and median market price, it emerges that, in some regions of market confidence space,
they diverge and reach extreme values.
Signal Type Mean ± Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HRT (mean) 1000.25 ± 3.6688 996.472 1000.096 1000.237 1000.378 1035.581
HRT (median) 996.736 1000.098 1000.239 1000.383 1016.071
FVA (mean) 2.4e+60 ± 2.1e+61 999.557 1000.490 1000.820 2.1e+17 5.7e+63
FVA (median) 997.11 1000.48 1000.816 4.2e+08 1.2e+32
TRA-S (mean) 1000.16 ± 1.7446 999.589 1000.064 1000.154 1000.246 1000.550
TRA-S (median) 999.56 1000.062 1000.154 1000.248 1000.563
Table 1: Market Prices. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Stan-
dard Deviation, Minimum value, First Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum
value) under the different common knowledge regimes. For each regime, the first line indi-
cates the distributional characteristics of the mean value while the second line indicates the
distributional characteristics of the median value.
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Figure 2: Mean Prices (left panel) and Median Prices (right panel) for FVA regime. Dis-
persion of results over space of market confidence (mS;mD). Each data point represents the
mean (respectively median) result of 1000 simulations over 500 periods t.
In order to gain insights into the reasons for this behavior, it is useful to observe the
distribution, over the parameter space, of mean and median market prices in Figure 2.
Under FVA regime, mean prices significantly diverge from the theoretical central level of
1000 when at least one market sentiment (either the one of supply or the one of demand
side) are speculative, implying mD ≥ 0.5 or mS ≥ 0.5, and especially where both market
sides are overconfident in the market signal, i.e. when (mD ≥ 0.5) ∩ (mS ≥ 0.5). Indeed,
where this overconfidence condition is met, bidding by either potential investors (demand)
or actual shareholders (supply) drives up the market pricing as long as the market price
trend goes up, because the market signal is overweighed - relative to other components -
in their forecasting. This creates an overwhelming self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing loop
since fundamental signal and market signal reinforce each other, pushing the market price
10
higher and higher. Only very low levels of market confidence by the other side of the
market (mD or mS < 0.2) can counterweight speculative beliefs that drive the market price
up. This happens because, where the market sides strongly differ in market confidence,
matching between demand and supply orders is reduced (see Figure 5). Lower bids on one
side of the market tend then to break the loop between market and fundamental signals,
keeping the market price dynamics in line with the expected central level. Notably, negative
bubbling (that is, bubbling dynamics that tends toward zero) is absent in average over
our simulations. This happens because our simplified trading strategies do not allow for
short selling, thus making it impossible for investors with price decreasing expectations to
drive the market price down. Additionally, even when the market trend enters a negative
bubble, the downward movement is limited to the minimum bound of zero, while the upward
movement is unbounded. Thus, the presence of negative bubbles in the area of overconfidence
(found by Biondi et al. 2012 studying single simulations) is hidden by the much bigger and
unconstrained values generated by positive bubbles.7
The existence of a significant distortion of market pricing under fair value accounting
regime is comforted by the median of the medians of market price (Figure 2, right panel).
This measure confirms that the market price distribution is severely strayed away from 1000
under this regime whenever both mD > 0.5 and mS > 0.5, that is, in the region of joint
overconfidence by both demand and supply sides. In the region where only one of them is
overconfident, conservative levels by the opposite side do counteract, driving the central level
back to the theoretical amount. This provides the additional finding that the formation of
market price bubbles in those areas is an extreme event that does not occur at the median
level of the distribution.
Overall, this results show that, under some conditions, the FVA is prone to generate
relevant market bubbles that materialize in our simulation through persistent explosions of
market prices. To be sure, simulated market price levels reach unrealistic values because
both investors and the corporate group are not budget-constrained, since a purely theoreti-
cal dynamics is under investigation here. These bubbles depend from the self-fulfilling and
self-reinforcing interaction between the market sentiment and the fundamental signal which,
in the case of FVA, communicates back to the market a fundamental information autocorre-
lated to the market price dynamics. This result also shows that, not only fair value regime
adds instability to the market, but also distorts its working in a self-reinforcing endogenously
generated chaos which strays the market pricing away from benchmarking level of fundamen-
tal performance. From the regulatory design perspective, this preliminary analysis seems to
indicate that introducing FVA may be a harmful choice for financial market stability, as for
actual market moods shift endogenously and remain outside control by regulatory authori-
ties. As showed here, shifts toward overconfidence in the market increase the probability of
formation of market price bubbles.
4.2 Market Volatility
One important characteristic upon which dynamic properties of financial market can be
assessed is volatility (pointing to the properties of the market price series at the univariate
7The average minimum price, over the FVA regime, is 997.43 (median 999.56) and a minimum of 39.06.
11
level). A classic measure of volatility can be computed as the logarithm of standard deviation
over the mean of the market price, averaged series by series:
v = log10
[
µp
σp
]
(10)
Table 2 shows the distributional characteristics of average volatility together with the
75% of the maximum (this latter measure has the objective of obtaining values relative to
volatility peak while excluding the most extreme events).
Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HRT (mean) 0.0036 0.0017 0.0021 0.0026 0.0036 0.3363
HRT (75% Peak) 0.0045 0.0021 0.003 0.0032 0.0045 0.4790
FVA (mean) 1.6436 0.0003 0.0006 0.0009 2.9661 8.7466
FVA (75% Peak) 1.7882 0.0004 0.0007 0.0010 4.3298 8.7466
TRA-S (mean) 0.0017 0.0011 0.0014 0.0016 0.0019 0.0034
TRA-S (75% Peak) 0.0021 0.0013 0.0017 0.0020 0.0023 0.0042
Table 2: First Lines: Mean volatility vt for market price series. Second Lines: Volatility
likelihood at 75% of the peak point. Comparison between the distributional characteristics
(Mean, Minimum value, First Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value)
under the different common knowledge regimes.
Even though no actual common knowledge regime can match the performance achieved
by theoretical TRA-S, the regime HRT still provides good systemic stability by reducing
overall volatility over the whole range of the parameter space of market confidence. This
better overall performance is obtained by reducing extreme volatility events, since fair value
accounting FVA does have better performances for both minimum volatility, and the first
and second quartiles (median). Indeed, the average volatility measures are increased due to
the occurrence extreme events with large volatility. Such dramatic events are enabled by
FVA but prevented by HRT. This analysis over the whole distribution of volatility is further
corroborated by taking a volatility measure at a certain peak point of this distribution, in
line with value-at-risk approaches. Indeed, taking the volatility measure at its third quartile8
(Table 2, second lines for each signal) we notice that the FVA shows clearly inferior perfor-
mance compared to both the theoretical TRA-S and the actual HRT regime. These results
are further corroborated studying the volatility width around the median value, summarized
in appendix. Volatility can be interpreted as a measure of the mis-pricing risk in financial
system dynamics. Our results show that, coeteris paribus, FVA increases beyond any fun-
damental change in the nature of the exchanged security this risk, through the interaction
between fundamental signal and market price dynamics.
8This peak point denotes the expected maximum value of volatility under that accounting regime at 75%
likelihood.
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4.3 Market Exuberance and Vagary
Market exuberance points to market prices dynamic that strays away from levels that are
reflected in fundamentals. In mathematical terms, this refers to the properties of the market
price series relative to the fundamental signal series (at the bivariate level). In order to study
this dimension of the financial system, we define the cumulated fundamental signal series
St that provides an evolving benchmark for ongoing market pricing process over time and
space as follows:
St =
t∑
n=0
Fn∀t with Fn=0 ≡ pt=0 = 1000 (11)
On this basis, we compute two measures of disconnection between the market price
dynamics and this cumulated fundamental signal dynamics:
• The first measure (Table 3, first line) is labelled dt and defined as the relative distance
between the current price and its lagged signal of reference, weighted by this latter
lagged signal. In order to exclude extreme events from our consideration, we take the
third quartile of this measure, providing an assessment of the maximum distance - at
75% likelihood - generated by the financial system over time. Formally:
Q3[dt] with dt ≡
pt − St−1
St−1
(12)
• The second measure, the mean exuberance (Table 3, second lines), captures an average
peak value in market exuberance on the whole simulation sample as follows:
exub ≡
∑
t(max dt −min dt)
Tmax
with Tmax = 500. (13)
Results regarding these measures are summarized in Table 3.
Signal Type Mean ± Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HRT (Q3[dt]) 0.0023 ± 0.0043 0.0002 0.0015 0.0019 0.0023 0.2922
HRT(exub) 2.10e-05 2.84e-06 1.41e-05 1.69e-05 1.98e-05 1.94e-03
FVA (Q3[dt]) 0.1018 ± 0.0160 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.1085 0.8660
FVA(exub) 2.22e-04 9.36e-07 2.65e-06 2.72e-06 2.81e-04 1.74e-03
TRA-S (Q3[dt]) 0.0019 ± 0.0030 0.0002 0.0013 0.0019 0.0025 0.0035
TRA-S (exub) 1.69e-05 2.79e-06 1.24e-05 1.72e-05 2.12e-05 2.98e-05
Table 3: First line: Expected maximum distance dt at 75% likelihood (see Equation 12 for
definition). Second Line: Mean exuberance (see Equation 13 for definition). Comparison
between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum value, First
Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) under the different common
knowledge regimes.
Considering that for complete absence of exuberance this measure would be 0, Q3[dt]
shows that HRT regime remains in line with TRA-S and does not generate any significant
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amount of exuberance. On the contrary, the FVA shows worse performances, allowing high
peaks of volatility in the superior half of the distribution and producing in average a measure
of exuberance of 10% around the fundamental signal of reference. Mean exuberance (second
lines of Table 3, for each regime) under FVA is significantly higher than both historical
accounting regime and the theoretical one. However, more significative is the fact that the
overall performance of FVA is skewed: it performs better than HRT for the inferior half of
the sample distribution, but worsens in the superior half, even though the maximum value
remains in line with historical cost accounting regimes. This points to the spatial organization
of its behavior over the overall market confidence space. This organization shows that higher
exuberance observed under FVA can be attributed to the more likely occurrence of extreme
events in which the market dynamics becomes relatively more exuberant.
Market exuberance is especially important because a persistent distance between the
fundamental signal and the market prices over time and contexts implies potential distortion
in allocation of resources through the market pricing process. Under exuberant conditions,
trades occur either above or below the central point of reference, implying inefficient and
unfair transfers of resources across investors and periods.
4.3.1 Market Vagary (Dynamic Disconnection)
From a dynamic perspective, market exuberance consists of a overall (comparatively static
or cross-sectional) disconnection between market prices and fundamental signals of reference.
Biondi et al. 2012 find insightful disconnection effects over time between the two dynamics,
leading market prices to stray away from their benchmark level of fundamental performance
for long durations. It is then interesting to disentangle here these dynamic effects of dis-
connection conceptually labelled market vagary or errancy hereafter. For this purpose let
define a dissociation measure as: Dt ≡ pt−St ∀t . For sake of this analysis, we choose a very
stringent definition of dissociation duration: we count one dissociation duration whenever Dt
strays away from its overall mean for more than two standard deviations for at least 10 time
periods t. We then compute the percentage of time9 periods over the overall length of every
simulation in which the fundamental signal is disconnected from the market price (Table
4, first lines for each regime), as well as the average length of the disconnection durations
(Table 4, second lines for each regime).
The dissemination of both measures on the parameter space of market confidence is signif-
icant (Figure 3). Theoretical common knowledge regime TRA-S shows better performances
around the parity line where (mj=D,t ≃ 0.5) ∩ (mj=S,t ≃ 0.5) ∀ t. This spatial organization
is crudely replicated by the HRT regime. Under the latter, the percentage of dissociation
time remains quite in line with the theoretical benchmark provided by TRA-S. Lower lev-
els are concentrated along the diagonal where market side opinions are quite similar or the
same (mD ≃ mS), especially where both opinions are not too conservative (i.e., outside the
corner area where mD ≃ mS < 0.2). Notably, a specific region of dissociation occurs in the
second quadrant, including along the diagonal. In this region, overconfidence in the market
signal by both demand and supply is in perpetual tension with fundamental signal HRT
that remains independent from market price trend. Speculative bubbles then continuously
9Given this strict definition of dissociation we find relatively low percentages of time that fall into this
category. This difference, however, preserves significant differences across common knowledge regimes.
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Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HRT (%) 0.3022 0 0.2606 0.3186 0.3602 0.5078
HRT (Periods) 16 0 15 16 17 21
FVA(%) 0.2722 0 0.0456 0.3608 0.39925 0.518
FVA (Periods) 14 0 16 17 18 36
TRA-S (%) 0.2419 0 0.1660 0.2606 0.3246 0.4446
TRA-S (Periods) 16 0 15 16 16 22
Table 4: First Lines: Percentage of time in which the market price evolution is dissociated
from the cumulated fundamental signal St. Second Lines: Mean Length of the dissociation
periods. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Minimum value, First
Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) under the different common
knowledge regimes.
attempt to occur but they eventually burst because of this dynamic tension. At the oppo-
site, for the corner area (where mD ≃ mS > 0.9), high overconfidence seems to predominate,
reducing then the impact of this tension. This phenomenon does not occur under TRA-S,
since investors that care about fundamental signals are assumed to treat a common target
fundamental value of reference, under this regime. This theoretical regime does not involve
stochastic trends in fundamentals that can trigger temporary speculative bubbles over time.
However, it is fair value common knowledge regime FVA that shows the worst perfor-
mances (higher disconnection durations). This happens everywhere but in the region where
volatility is the highest and market prices are distorted at their first order (see Sections 4.1 on
market pricing and 4.2 on market volatility). In this region, overconfident opinions by both
sides of the market continuously agree on upward market price trends, making the market
less vagarious but dysfunctional. The market pricing mechanism fixes a clearing price that,
even though it remains in line with the fundamental signal, is distorted (since in this area the
market price and the signal are auto-correlated by construction). The fundamental signal is
then unable to provide any rebalancing benchmark. It cannot act as an ‘accounting light-
house’ for investors (Biondi 2011a,c), leaving them alone with their consensual but distorting
beliefs. In this sense, the better performance of FVA is achieved at the cost of the possibility
of much higher volatility, exuberance and more likely occurrence of extreme events regarding
market price dynamics. In sum, FVA shows its better performance where it becomes unable
to drive financial system dynamics in line with benchmark level of fundamental performance,
while it shows worst performance elsewhere.
This inference is comforted by exploring the mean time length of dissociation (Table
4, second lines, and Figure 4). Again, the performance of FVA in general is obtained by
compensating worst results away with those, distorted, from the overconfidence area (second
quadrant) of the parameter space of market confidence. On the contrary, all the other
common knowledge regimes obtain their best performances (implying shorter dissociation
time length) in association with both the parity line and the absolute parity point where
mD = 0.5 ∩mS = 0.5.
It is important to study measures of market vagary together with measures of market
exuberance since both provide complementary information about the relationship between
market price and fundamental signal, clearly showing tendency by FVA to generate market
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Figure 3: Percentage of time in which the market price pt is dissociated from the cumulated
fundamental signal St generated by HRT (Left Panel), FVA (Central Panel) and TRA-S
(Right Panel). Dispersion of results in space of parameters (mS;mD). Each data point
represents the average result of 1000 simulations over 500 periods t.
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Figure 4: Mean Length of dissociation periods for HRT (Left panel), FVA (Central Panel)
and TRA-S (Right Panel). Dispersion of results in space of market confidence (mS;mD).
Each data point represents the average result of 1000 simulations of 500 periods t.
bubbles over that fundamental level of reference. This implies that, not only FVA involves
more volatile market price dynamics (as discussed in Section 4.1), but may also precludes the
market pricing process to properly and timely incorporate fundamental signals. Financial
market becomes then vagarious, evolving in a fundamentally erratic way that goes even
beyond market exuberance over those same fundamental levels of performance.
4.4 Market Liquidity
By market liquidity, we mean the ability by the Share Exchange to satisfy trade orders
posted by potential investors wishing to buy (potential demand) or sell (potential supply),
at any trade time t. The degree of market liquidity measures then whether and how much
the market matching process enables investors which want to trade to do so.
In particular, our aggregative market matching protocol denotes two areas: one larger
area comprises all investors potentially willing to trade (market area); another - smaller -
area comprises all investors that may actually contribute to the clearing process given the
bids on the opposite market side (clearing area). The study of the ratio between these two
areas (by construction comprised between zero and one) provides some understanding of the
timely satisfaction of investors’ orders at each market period t, pointing to market liquidity
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as measured by posted orders satisfaction. While the numerical values are quite in line for
all accounting regimes, their organization over the parameter space of market confidence
(Figure 5) results to be distorted in the case of FVA, especially around the second quadrant
denoting market overconfidence shared by both supply and demand.
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Figure 5: Market liquidity expressed as the ratio between investors that participate to the
clearing process (clearing area) and those potentially interested in participating to the mar-
ket (market area). Dispersion of results in space of market confidence (mS;mD). Each
data point represents the average result of 1000 simulations over 500 periods t. Market
ratio is represented for for HRT (Upper Left Panel), TRA-S (Upper right Panel) and FVA
(Lower Left Panel). Lower right panel: Percentage of satisfied supply for the FVA common
knowledge regime.
Under TRA-S and HRT, market liquidity is symmetric along the diagonal. Orders satis-
faction is then increased as long as market confidence is similar on both sides of the market,
and maximal where mD = mS independently from how conservative or speculative market
sentiments are. Orders satisfaction is minimal at the corner where market sentiments on the
two sides of the market are opposite, that is, where (mD → 0) ∩ (mS → 1) and vice-versa.
In case of conservative weight attributed to the market price trend, the market match-
ing process works under FVA as well, enabling a high proportion of orders satisfaction for
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investors willing to exchange. However, under FVA, this result does not hold for the re-
gion where at least one market side sentiment tends to be speculative, implying (mD >
0.5) ∪ (mS > 0.5) and especially in the area where (mD > 0.5) ∩ (mS > 0.5). Here, high
market liquidity is maintained only around the diagonal (for market moods by both market
sides that are very similar to each other), while the rest of the region shows lower efficiency
relative to HRT. This phenomenon results from market instability in that region: both sides
are highly confident in the market signal but they do not agree on the precise weight to
assign it, thus generating lower levels of market liquidity. This interpretation is confirmed
by studying the percentage of satisfied supply in that region (Figure 5). In the part above
the diagonal, supply is more overconfident about the market signal than demand, leading
to higher levels of unsatisfied supply orders. At the opposite, in the part below the diago-
nal, demand is more overconfident than supply, leading to lower levels of unsatisfied supply
orders. Potential suppliers (buyers) are here overconfident about the market trend relative
to potential buyers, willing to selling (buying) at a higher degree than potential buyers
(sellers). This generates over supply (demand) that cannot be absorbed by an aggregate
matching process based upon disagreement. Orders remain then unsatisfied at a higher de-
gree because of such over-disagreement. In the other regions, however, the market matching
process remains satisfyingly around its expected level of one half (implied by the assumption
of uniform distribution on both sides of the market).
4.5 Information quality
In the context of accounting and economics literature, the linear correlation between market
price and market signal (denoted here by cov[pt;St]) is generally employed to assess the
quality of accounting information (Lintner 1956; Demsetz 1997; Lev and Zarowin 1999).10
This section provides results for the distributional characteristics of cross-sectional and lagged
correlations between these two variables in Tables 5 and 6.
Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HRT (mean) 0.8177 0.3988 0.7330 0.8191 0.9059 0.9895
HRT(median) 0.5030 0.8261 0.8891 0.9444 0.9919
FVA (mean) 0.9585 0.8157 0.9210 0.9759 0.9980 1
FVA (median) 0.9380 0.9724 0.9907 1 1
TRA-S (mean) 0.4803 -0.0644 0.2735 0.4592 0.6917 0.9698
TRA-S (median) -0.0847 0.3548 0.5667 0.7828 0.9771
Table 5: Cross-sectional covariance between cumulated fundamental signal St and market
price pt. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Minimum value, First
Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) under the different common
knowledge regimes. For each regime, the first line indicates the distributional characteristics
of the mean value while the second line indicates the distributional characteristics of the
median value.
As one can observe, FVA shows high degrees of cross-sectional correlation between market
10The relationship between this hypothesis and an equilibrium approach is acknowledged but not investi-
gated here.
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price and fundamental signal, both in absolute terms and compared to the HRT and TRA-
S regimes. Some might be then tempted to conclude that FVA provides better accounting
information quality. However, as we have seen in the previous sections, this comes at the cost
of higher instability, exuberance and vagary imposed to the financial system dynamics. By
taking the theoretical accounting regime as benchmark, only the latter shows some negative
cross-sectional correlation that is expected when the market price series overshoots-and-
reverts around the fundamental signal series. Contrary to the common interpretation of this
variable, higher (average) correlation seems then to imply worse systemic performances, with
respect to theoretical common knowledge regime benchmark. On this basis, historical cost
accounting regime HRT seems to perform better, since its average (median) correlation is
less than fair value accounting regime.
The correlation between the market price at time t (pt) and the lagged fundamental
signal (St−1) at time t− 1 (Table 6) points to the forecast power of the common knowledge
information over the market price series one-step-ahead. It is notable that this correlation is
unstable over time and contexts, confirming that no trading strategies can reasonably exploit
it systematically across situations. Furthermore, the theoretical regime TRA-S shows inferior
linear forecast power, surely because of market price overshoot-and-revert effect around its
benchmark level. From this perspective, the superior forecast power showed by fair value
accounting FVA may be assessed negatively, since it depends on its autocorrelation more
than its capacity to drive investment behaviors to fit with benchmark levels of fundamental
performance.
Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HRT (mean) 0.8265 0.40404 0.74102 0.82773 0.91566 1
HRT(median) 0.50969 0.83423 0.89812 0.95387 1
FVA (mean) 0.95928 0.8167 0.92969 0.97717 0.99853 1
FVA (median) 0.9387 0.97309 0.99184 1 1
TRA-S (mean) 0.51089 -0.006575 0.30085 0.48942 0.72541 1
TRA-S (median) -0.016519 0.3866 0.60198 0.81851 1
Table 6: One-period lagged covariance between cumulated fundamental signal St−1 and
market price pt. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Minimum
value, First Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) under the different
common knowledge regimes. For each regime, the first line indicates the distributional char-
acteristics of the mean value while the second line indicates the distributional characteristics
of the median value.
5 Conclusive Remarks
Through numerical simulations and visualizations, this paper develops a comprehensive eco-
nomic analysis of the theoretical model developed by Biondi et al. (2012). It assesses market
price formation and behavior under alternative common knowledge regimes coupled with
various combinations of speculative and fundamentalist beliefs on supply and demand sides,
with a view to financial market stability, volatility, exuberance, vagary and liquidity. These
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systemic properties prove to be sensitive to regulatory regimes for fundamental information
provision that correspond to stylized accounting models of reference for financial reporting
and prudential regulation.
Through mere observation of linear correlation between market prices and fundamental
signals, some might conclude that common knowledge provision regimes based upon mark-to-
market measurement of traded security (FVA) represent a better source of public information
about the fundamental performance of security-issuing corporate group. However, we show
that this high linear correlation comes together with relevant reduction in systemic properties
of the financial system as a whole. In particular, FVA-based regimes prove to involve market
misplacing and higher volatility. They also imply higher degree of exuberance and errancy
(pointing to the disconnection of the market price series from the underlying fundamental
signal series of traded security) coupled with lower levels of orders’ satisfaction for both sides
of the financial trading (which point to possible liquidity issues). Under FVA-based regimes,
therefore, there exists higher likelihood and materiality of financial market instability and
bubbling, related to market price erratic behavior over time and contexts.
Our results are particularly significant since the systemic properties of common knowledge
regimes under investigation do radically depend on investors’ relative confidence on the
market price dynamics. As the latter factor is not generally under control by regulatory
bodies which can shape the common knowledge provision regimes, this dependence implies
that adoption and implementation of mark-to-market regimes may increase likelihood of
market bubbling and inefficiency when market conditions become overconfident. Our study
thus recommends to test the economic consequences of regulatory designs and control systems
under a large set of situations through simulation, experiment and exploratory field studies.
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Appendix 1 - Summary of common knowledge regimes
Together with the HRT, FVA and TRA-S common knowledge regimes (introduced in Equa-
tions 3, 4 and 5) we analyze here two further regimes as robustness check of the results for
HRT and TRA-S respectively.
The Historical Cost Accounting (HCA) regime implies an evolving exogenous signal
of fundamental performance that is orthogonal to market price dynamics and results from
stochastic positive and negative flows (Biondi 2011c):
Ft = N [−1;+1] + ǫt ∀t (14)
The Fixed Target Reverting Accounting (TRA-F) regime implies instead a revert-
ing fundamental performance signal that targets a fixed core value of reference:
Ft = −(pt − Ft−1) + ǫt ∀t (15)
Again, for these two accounting regimes the same stochastic error (introduced in Equation
6) is added to account for estimation error, measurement error and other random effects.
Overall, we propose in this paper results for five different mechanisms (summarized in
Table 7) generating common knowledge information inspired from distinctive accounting
regimes: two belonging to the historical cost accounting model family; one belonging to
the fair value (current value, mark-to-market) accounting model family and two providing a
theoretical benchmark derived from equilibrium approaches, involving target-based signaling
provision. We refer to the first three regimes as actual regimes as they denote stylized
practical modes of accounting, while referring to the last two regimes as theoretical regimes
that are and can be only thought in a vacuum.
Actual accounting regimes
Historical Cost Historical Accounting (HCA)
Accounting Family
Historical Random Trend
Accounting (HRT)
Current Value (Mark-to-Market) Fair value accounting (FVA)
Accounting family
Theoretical accounting regimes Fixed target reverting accounting (TRA-F)
Stochastic target reverting accounting (TRA-S)
Table 7: Taxonomy of the common knowledge regimes discussed in this paper.
Appendix 2 - Data tables (comparisons across common
knowledge regimes)
In this appendix we reproduce the tables displayed in the main text including also the
omitted results for the theoretical Fixed Target Reverting Accounting (TRA-F) regime and
for the actual Historical Cost Accounting (HCA) regime. Tables 10 and 13 are instead only
reported here to confirm results observed through other variables in the main text.
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Market Pricing
Signal Type Mean ± Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HCA(mean) 1000.251 ± 3.5212 996.986 1000.098 1000.238 1000.377 1022.292
HCA (median) 996.7165 1000.098 1000.239 1000.379 1003.872
HRT (mean) 1000.253 ± 3.6688 996.472 1000.096 1000.237 1000.378 1035.581
HRT (median) 996.736 1000.098 1000.239 1000.383 1016.071
FVA (mean) 2.4e+60 ± 2.1e+61 999.557 1000.490 1000.820 2.1e+17 5.7e+63
FVA (median) 997.108 1000.483 1000.816 4.2e+08 1.2e+32
TRA-F (mean) 1000.154 ± 0.1983 999.963 1000.071 1000.144 1000.232 1000.394
TRA-F (median) 999.962 1000.072 1000.144 1000.232 1000.398
TRA-S (mean) 1000.155 ± 1.7446 999.589 1000.064 1000.154 1000.246 1000.550
TRA-S (median) 999.568 1000.062 1000.154 1000.248 1000.563
Table 8: Market Prices. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Stan-
dard Deviation, Minimum value, First Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum
value) under the different common knowledge regimes. For each regime, the first line indi-
cates the distributional characteristics of the mean value while the second line indicates the
distributional characteristics of the median value.
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Market Volatility
Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HCA(mean) 0.0035 0.0017 0.0021 0.0025 0.0036 0.3205
HCA (75% Peak) 0.0043 0.0020 0.0025 0.0031 0.0043 0.4823
HRT(mean) 0.0037 0.0018 0.0022 0.0027 0.0037 0.3363
HRT (75% Peak) 0.0045 0.0021 0.0026 0.0032 0.0045 0.4791
FVA (mean) 1.6436 0.0003 0.0006 0.0010 2.9661 8.7466
FVA (75% Peak) 1.7882 0.0004 0.0007 0.0010 4.3298 8.7466
TRA-F(mean) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
TRA-F (75% Peak) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004
TRA-S (mean) 0.0017 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016 0.0019 0.0035
TRA-S (75% Peak) 0.0021 0.0014 0.0017 0.0020 0.0024 0.0042
Table 9: First Lines: Mean volatility vt for market price series. Second Lines: Volatility
likelihood at 75% of the peak point. Comparison between the distributional characteristics
(Mean, Minimum value, First Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value)
under the different common knowledge regimes.
The volatility width Wv around its median (Q2v) further comforts the results that regard
the Market volatility. Lets define:
Wv =
Q3v −Q1v
Q2v
∀t (16)
where Q1, Q2 and Q3 respectively represents the first quartile, the median value and the third
quartile of the market volatility distribution. We can observe in Table 10 that historical cost
regimes remain in line with performance by theoretical regimes while the fair value regime
shows anomalously high values of volatility width.
Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HCA 0.5658 0.4821 0.5495 0.5647 0.5809 1.2735
HRT 0.5668 0.4795 0.5502 0.5655 0.5818 1.0926
FVA 28.1821 0 0.5529 0.6397 0.6976 3809.6
TRA-F 0.6081 0.4867 0.5667 0.6019 0.6498 0.7624
TRA-S 0.5513 0.4870 0.5362 0.5507 0.5658 0.6376
Table 10: Volatility width Wv of the signal around its median (see Equation 16 for defini-
tion). Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Minimum value, First
Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) over the different common
knowledge regimes (mean behaviour).
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Market Exuberance and Vagary
Signal Type Mean ± Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HCA (75% Peak) 0.0022 ± 0.0041 0.0002 0.0014 0.0018 0.0022 0.2647
HCA (exub) 2.00e-05 2.52e-06 1.35e-05 1.62e-05 1.89e-05 0.0018
HRT (75% Peak) 0.0023 ± 0.0043 0.0002 0.0015 0.0019 0.0023 0.2922
HRT (exub) 2.10e-05 2.84e-06 1.41e-05 1.69e-05 1.98e-05 0.0019
FVA (75% Peak) 0.1018 ± 0.0160 9.68e-05 0.0003 0.0003 0.1085 0.8660
FVA (exub) 2.22e-04 9.36e-07 2.65e-06 2.72e-06 2.81e-04 1.73e-03
TRA-F(75% Peak) 0.0005 ± 0.0003 2.49e-05 0.0003 0.0005 0.0007 0.0012
TRA-F(exub) 2.09e-06 2.83e-07 1.41e-06 2.12e-06 2.78e-06 3.67e-06
TRA-S (75% Peak) 0.0019 ± 0.0033 0.0002 0.0013 0.0019 0.0025 0.0035
TRA-S(exub) 1.69e-05 2.79e-06 1.24e-05 1.72e-05 2.12e-05 2.98e-05
Table 11: First line: Expected maximum distance dt at 75% likelihood (see Equation 12 for
definition). Second Line: Mean exuberance (see Equation 13 for definition). Comparison
between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum value, First
Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) under the different common
knowledge regimes.
Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HCA (%) 0.2986 0 0.2562 0.3154 0.3575 0.5108
HCA (length) 16 0 15 16 17 22
HRT(%) 0.3022 0 0.2605 0.3186 0.3602 0.5078
HRT(length) 16 0 16 16 17 21
FVA(%) 0.2722 0 0.0456 0.3608 0.3992 0.5180
FVA(length) 14 0 16 17 18 36
TRA-F(%) 0.2618 0 0.1888 0.2892 0.3436 0.4822
TRA-F(length) 16 0 16 17 17 20
TRA-S(%) 0.24186 0 0.166 0.2606 0.3246 0.4446
TRA-S(length) 16 0 15 16 16 22
Table 12: First Lines: Percentage of time in which the market price evolution is dissociated
from the cumulated fundamental signal St. Second Lines: Mean Length of the dissociation
periods. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Minimum value, First
Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) under the different common
knowledge regimes.
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Market Liquidity
Signal Type Mean ± Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HCA (mean) 0.7234 ± 0.2173 0.4916 0.6261 0.7121 0.8153 0.9944
HCA (median) 0.4985 0.6728 0.7767 0.8822 1
HRT (mean) 0.7232 ± 0.2166 0.4899 0.6263 0.7124 0.8149 0.9944
HRT (median) 0.4965 0.6728 0.7767 0.8823 1
FVA (mean) 0.6925 ± 0.1932 0.4205 0.5918 0.6648 0.7854 0.9923
FVA (median) 0.3727 0.6174 0.7052 0.8372 1
TRA-F (mean) 0.7205 ± 0.2202 0.4855 0.6188 0.7101 0.8153 0.9921
TRA-F (median) 0.4849 0.6627 0.7751 0.8828 1
TRA-S (mean) 0.7208 ± 0.2179 0.4792 0.6184 0.7111 0.8169 0.9944
TRA-S(median) 0.4831 0.6638 0.7761 0.8838 1
Table 13: Ratio between the agents that participate to the clearing process and the total of
those willing to trade. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Stan-
dard Deviation, Minimum value, First Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum
value) under the different common knowledge regimes. For each regime, the first line indi-
cates the distributional characteristics of the mean value while the second line indicates the
distributional characteristics of the median value.
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Information Quality
Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HCA (mean) 0.8182 0.4124 0.7335 0.8186 0.9067 0.9897
HCA (median) 0.5306 0.8269 0.8881 0.9453 0.9922
HRT (mean) 0.8177 0.3988 0.7330 0.8191 0.9059 0.9895
HRT(median) 0.5029 0.8261 0.8891 0.9444 0.9919
FVA (mean) 0.9585 0.8157 0.9290 0.9759 0.9981 1
FVA (median) 0.9380 0.9724 0.9907 1 1
TRA-F (mean) 0.2845 -0.3577 -0.0258 0.2391 0.5856 0.9695
TRA-F (median) -0.5335 -0.0492 0.3230 0.7066 0.9756
TRA-S (mean) 0.4803 -0.0645 0.2735 0.4592 0.6917 0.9697
TRA-S (median) -0.0847 0.3548 0.5667 0.7828 0.9771
Table 14: Cross-sectional covariance between cumulated fundamental signal St and market
price pt. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Minimum value, First
Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) under the different common
knowledge regimes. For each regime, the first line indicates the distributional characteristics
of the mean value while the second line indicates the distributional characteristics of the
median value.
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Signal Type Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
HCA (mean) 0.8270 0.4177 0.7414 0.8277 0.9165 1
HCA (median) 0.5339 0.83508 0.8972 0.9542 1
HRT (mean) 0.8265 0.4040 0.7410 0.8277 0.9156 1
HRT(median) 0.5097 0.8342 0.8981 0.9539 1
FVA (mean) 0.9593 0.8167 0.9297 0.9772 0.9985 1
FVA (median) 0.9387 0.9731 0.9918 1 1
TRA-F (mean) 0.3117 -0.3464 0.0002 0.2680 0.6183 1
TRA-F (median) -0.5225 -0.0193 0.3598 0.7451 1
TRA-S (mean) 0.5109 -0.0066 0.3008 0.4894 0.7254 1
TRA-S (median) -0.0165 0.3866 0.6020 0.8185 1
Table 15: One-period lagged covariance between cumulated fundamental signal St−1 and
market price pt. Comparison between the distributional characteristics (Mean, Minimum
value, First Quartile, Median value, Third Quartile and Maximum value) under the different
common knowledge regimes. For each regime, the first line indicates the distributional char-
acteristics of the mean value while the second line indicates the distributional characteristics
of the median value.
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